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1 Ethnic questions in the Census 
Although questions about the current size – as w ll as the likely future growth – of the minority 
components of the population tend to stir up strong public eactions, providing accurate answers to 
what might seem to be some straightforward questions is still an extremely challenging task. Whilst 
the starting point for any kind of demographic analysis is the comprehensive population count made 
in the Census, it was not until 1991 that a specifically formulated question was included in the UK 
exercise: prior to that all estimates had to rely on the results of the Country of Birth question. This 
was intrinsically problematic, however. Quite apart from the fact that such figures included a 
significant (but unknown) number of people of wholly indigenous ancestry had been born overseas, 
country of birth statistics can only identify the first generation of true immigrants: the UK-born 
children of migrant parentage are necessarily overlooked. To be sure this deficiency could be 
partially remedied by collating the figures for all those living in households headed by a person 
born in specific locations overseas – as was done after the 1981 Census – but the more a second and 
then a third generation emerge into adulthood, the more inadequate this procedure becomes.  
 
Yet  although the inclusion of an explicit question about ethnic affiliation in the 1991 Census was 
undoubtedly a welcome advance, there were a number of severe deficienci s in the format of the 
question which was actually deployed. For example: 
· Since the question offered no an explicit indication as to whether ‘ethnic group’ should be 
understood as being a consequence of differences in biological descent, of community
affiliation or of birthplace, it could be – and was – interpreted in different ways by different 
groups of respondents.  
· Whilst the question provided a range of non-European groups with an opportunity to identify 
themselves in ethno-national terms, it encouraged virtually everyone else (and especially 
members of the indigenous majority) to identify themselves racially as White; and even when 
respondents sought to offer a less racist form self-definition (although remarkably few did so), 
they were invariably reclassified as white during the coding process.  
· As a result of these procedures many smaller minority groups, such as the Arabs, the Yemenis, 
and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, let alone members of Britain’s many invisible minority 
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communities, uch as the Jews, the Irish Catholics and the Poles have been disappeared from 
statistical sight. As a result they are rarely, if ever, referred to in discussions of ethnic plurality..  
· Last but not whilst ethno-national labels such as Indian, Pakistani, Chinese and Black African 
may appear to be sensible and useful identifiers as far as outside observers are concerned, they 
are by no means necessarily congruent with the minority communities’ internal realities. Hence 
each of these categories – now reinforced through their routine use in the census and all 
commentaries built upon it – conceals more than it reveals. Data-collection exercises which are 
unable to resolve the differences between such substantial communities as the Gujarati Hindus 
and the Punjabi Sikhs, or between the Punjabi and Kashmiri Pakistanis, can only be regarded as 
deficient. 
Even so, something is better than nothing, and the results of the 1991 Census, together with the 
results of many other surveys and data-gathering exercises which have deployed the same set of 
ethnic categories as those used in the Census, means that we are now in a position to construct a far 
more detailed – as well as a far more accurate – picture of the major components of the visible 
minority presence in Britain th  we could do before.  
1.1 Measuring pluralism: the construction of an ethnic question1  
 
Although there was very real prospect that an ethnic question might be included in the 1981 Census, 
difficulties in formulating a question which would be acceptable to Afro-Caribbean respondents, 
reinforced by a last minute Prime Ministerial intervention by Margaret Thatcher led to its exclusion 
from the Census schedule. However following a strongly favourable report by the Home Affairs 
Select Committee the consensus began to shift, and there was little opposition to its inclusion in the 
1991 exercise.  
 
Yet although the decision to make a formal note of the ethnic affiliation of every citizen was a quite 
unprecedented development, since it not only entailed a formal acknowledgement that Britain is – 
and is likely to remain – an plural society, but also that ethnic diversity is an issue which can and 
should routinely be taken into account in the formulation of public policy, remarkably little 
analytical attention was given to the wording of the question which was actually posed. Hence 
before considering the results of the exercise threw it is worth considering just how the question 
itself was actually constructed, and hence what it can  and cannot tell us. 
                                           
1 A fuller discussion of the issues explored in this section can be found in Ballard (1997). 
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Figure 1 The “Ethnic Group” question in the 1991 Census 
 
Although the question actually posed in the Census offered no specific indication as to how the term 
“Ethnic Group” should be understood, the format nevertheless proved acceptable to the population 
at large: no less than 98.6% of respondents ticked one or other of the labelled boxes, and only 1.4% 
took advantage of the write-in option, making the coding of the results a very straightforward task. 
Yet despite the ease with which the question ‘worked’ in administrative terms, it does not 
necessarily follow that the bodies of people associated with each of the labels which the census 
authorities constructed necessarily constitute form ethnic groups in any very meaningful 
sociological sense.  
 
So, for example, whilst no less than 94% of those who ticked a labelled box did so in such a way as 
to identify themselves White, a moment’s reflection reveals that White is a racial, not an ethnic 
category. This is far from mere wordplay. Not only did this procedure write indigenous British 
pluralism out of the agenda by removing the possibility of the Welsh, the Scots and the Irish – let
alone the English! – to identify themselves as such, but it also provided members of many other 
more or less invisible minorities such as the Jews, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the Arabs 
with what they may well have regarded as a welcome opportunity n t to associate themselves with 
any of the racially excluded minorities, and instead to identify themselves as White (Ballard and 
Kalra, 1994). From this perspective the label White can best be understood as a carefully 
constructed umbrella under which everyone who does not consider themselves to belong to any of 
the other labelled categories can, and i deed should, take shelter. The underlying logic of the whole 
exercise then becomes all too clear. To the extent that all the other labels are associated with one 
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form or another of non-Europeanness, the category White stands as its logical inverse. If so th  
otherwise puzzling acceptability of White as identifier by the vast majority of the population begins 
to make greater sense: it provided an opportunity an opportunity for members the dominant 
majority to identify themselves as not non-white.  
 
But if that is so, why were the other five more specifically ethnic labels included in the question? 
The answer is obvious enough. Whilst obsessive concern with the social significance of skin colour 
serves to explain the contorted modes of thinking just outl ed, those who have found themselves 
marginalised as a result of exposure to this kind of racist myopia have refused – sensibly enough – 
to buy into this mode of thinking on their own account. Hence members of Britain’s Indian, 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Chinese communities – whether immigrant or British-born – have 
insisted that their national origins should be the basis of their ethnic self-identification. By contrast 
the Black-Caribbean, Black-African and Black-Other labels which the census has brought into 
routine use introduce further complexities, since they combine skin-based and ethnic identifiers.  
 
Two very different issues are at stake here. The first is relatively simple: the label Black African 
provides a convenient means for people of indigen us African descent to distinguish themselves 
from East African Asians – the vast majority of whom currently prefer to identify themselves 
ethnically as Indian. However the Black Caribbean case has presented some much deeper 
challenges. Whilst most of the older generation of migrants are happy enough to identify 
themselves as Caribbean, many of their British-born children have been most reluctant to associate 
themselves with such an identifier, on the grounds that it suggested that they were not Bri is; hence 
categories such as Black British and Black other were constructed to answer to their concerns. But 
however reasonable those concerns may be, the solution devised to deal with have been – at least 
from a statistical perspective – quite disastrous. Although those people whose ancestral roots lie in 
the Caribbean (and beyond that in Africa) undoubtedly form an ethnically distinctive community, 
the way in which the Ethnic Group question was formulated is such that a straightforward statistical 
read-out distributes its members into two quite separate population categories. Since this can easily 
lead to wholly misleading conclusions, the census figures for Black Caribbeans and Black Others 
have been combined under the label Afro-Caribbean in most Tables in this Chapter.  
1.2 Britain as a plural society: a demographic overview  
As Table 1 demonstrates, Britain’s non-White population is particularly heavily concentrated in 
England, where 5.6% of the population as a whole identified themselves as belonging to one or 
other of the visible minorities in 1991, whilst in both Wales and Scotland that figure barely 
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exceeded 1%. It is also worth remembering that within England itself there are further spatial 
imbalances, with the result that the minority population is still very heavily concentrated in those 
areas where its members found employment when they first arrived: in the London region (where 
nearly 50% of the visible minority population is now concentrated), in the industrial cities of the 
east and west Midlands, in centres of steel manufacturing such as Sheffield and Scunthorpe, and in 
all the textile towns in the Pennine region. In such contexts, and especially in the local areas within 
each city where members of the new minorities have clustered together, their proportionate 
presence in the population is very much higher. 
 
  England Wales Scotland Great Britain 
 Persons % of total 
population 
Persons % of total 
population 
Persons % of total 
population  
Persons % of total 
population 
Indians 823,821 1.75 6,384 0.23 10,050 0.2 840,255 1.53 
Pakistanis 449,646 0.96 5,717 0.20 21,192 0.42 476,555 0.87 
Bangladeshis 157,881 0.34 3,820 0.13 1,134 0.02 162,835 0.30 
Chinese 141,661 0.30 4,801 0.17 10,476 0.21 156,938 0.29 
Other Asian 189,253 0.40 3,677 0.13 4,604 0.09 197,534 0.36 
Afro-Caribbeans 667,964 1.42 6,821 0.24 3,580 0.07 678,365 1.24 
Black Africans 206,918 0.44 2,671 0.09 2,773 0.06 212,362 0.39 
All Minorities 2,637,144 5.60 33,891 1.20 53,809 1.08 2,724,844 4.96 
Table 1 Regional distribution of the visible minority populations in Great Britain 
Source: 1991 Census, Ethnic Group and Country of Birth, Table 6.  
 
It is always worth remembering that whilst large scale surveys such as the census can throw up a 
richly illuminating picture of the social and demographic characteristics of a given population 
group, that picture is by definition a snapshot in time, for the underlying social reality may well be 
changing rapidly. This is most certainly so in the case of Britain’s visible minority populatio s, for 
as Table 2 shows, this section of the population has been growing extremely rapidly ever since mass 
migration began in the aftermath of the second world war. Moreover the figures in Table 3 suggest 
that there is every reason to expect that even in he unlikely event of further immigration from the 
non-European world being brought to an absolute halt, this pattern of growth will sustained for 
many decades to come, given that the scale of the minority presence in the very youngest age cohort 
of 0 – 4 year olds is almost double the mean level for the population at large. With this in mind it is 
worth subjecting what we know about the migratory and the demographic characteristics of each 
section of the visible minority population to close scrutiny to establish their likely pattern of future 
growth.  
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Census 
year 
Indians Pakistanis 
and 
Bangladeshis 
Chinese Afro-
Caribbeans 
Black 
Africans 
Total 
1991      840,255        639,390        156,938        678,365        212,362   2,527,310  
1981      855,025        360,023        120,123        545,744          79,649         1,960,564  
1971      340,370        127,565          60,000        360,000          40,000      927,935  
1961       81,400           81,400          29,600        171,800          19,800      384,000  
1951       30,800           30,800          12,000          15,300            5,600        94,500  
Table 2 Estimated size of the major components of Britain’s visible minority populations: 
1951 – 1991 
Sources: 1991 Census Ethnic Croup Tables, 1981 Census Country of Birth of Household Head 
Tables, 1971 Census Country of Birth Tables, and EJB Rose (1969) Table 10.1 
 
 All ages Aged 0 - 4 
 Persons % of total 
population 
Persons % of total 
population  
Whites 51,873,794 94.51 3,298,674 90.79 
Indians 840,255 1.53 74,042 2.04 
Pakistanis 476,555 0.87 62,576 1.72 
Bangladeshis 162,835 0.30 24,526 0.68 
Chinese 197,534 0.36 15,842 0.44 
Other Asian 156,938 0.29 11,129 0.31 
Afro-Caribbeans 678,365 1.24 73,964 2.04 
Black Africans 212,362 0.39 25,115 0.69 
All Minorities 2,724,844 4.96 287194 7.9 
Table 3 Ethnic diversity in Britain: the relative size of each group in the  0 – 4 y ar old age 
cohort as compared with the population at large. 
Source: 1991 Census : Ethnic group and Country of Birth Volume, Table 6. 
1.3 Population growth amongst the visible minorities: a case by case exploration 
In considering the likely trajectory of population growth amongst Britain’s minority populations, 
two main factors need to be borne in mind: firstly the relative balance of immigration and 
emigration, and secondly that between births and deaths. However the factors which give rise to 
such outcomes are not only extremely complex, but also tend to be communi y-specific: hence a 
detailed knowledge of the history, of the socio-g ographical trajectories, and above all of the 
dynamics of fertility and family-building within each community is vital to the successful 
completion of such an exercise. Moreover once such information is available, it not only throws a 
great deal of light on the demographic characteristics of each section of the minority population, but 
also provides a good indication as to its likely pattern of growth in the immediate future.  
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1.3.1 The Pakistanis 
With this in mind it is worth subjecting the distribution of Britain’s Pakistani population across the 
age spectrum to close scrutiny, since it not only provides a clear indication of the way in which each 
group’s migration history, together its members’ equally distinctive patterns of fertility and 
marriage choice, have interacted to precipitate a specific demographic outcome, but also shows how 
the impact of these specificities is likely to be felt for many years to come.  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Britain’s Pakistani population by age and sex 
Source: 1991 Census: Ethnic group and Country of Birth Volume, Table 6. 
As is dramatically evident from Figure 2, Britain’s Pakistani population is very sharply skewed 
across the age spectrum: hence whilst it still only contains a minute number of elderly people, the 
number of young people under the age of 15 is disproportionately large. Moreover close inspection 
of the figures also reveals a distinct “wave”, most particularly amongst men, with clear peaks at 15-
year intervals, the first amongst the 50 – 59 age cohort, the second amongst the 30 – 39 age cohort, 
and the third amongst children aged between 5 and 14. Whilst the data itself can provide no clues as 
to the origins of these outcomes – since Census figures are by definition a freeze-f am  snapshot of 
complex on-going processes – these patterns can easily be explained given some knowledge of this 
population’s migratory history. Mass migration from Pakistan took off almost exponentially in the 
early 1960s, and although the 1962 Immigration Act was designed to curb this inflow by excluding 
all those who did not have jobs to go to, established Pakistani migrants, many of whom worked in 
the still labour-hungry textile mills in the Pennine region, proved particularly dept at obtaining 
employment vouchers on behalf of kinsmen back home. Hence – paradoxically enough – t e inflow 
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from Pakistan actually increased in the immediate aftermath of the introduction of the new rules, 
although it then dropped very sharply when the issue of such vouchers was halted in 1965.  
 
Most of the men who came to work in Britain in this early period were young adults aged between 
twenty and thirty; three decades on they were aged between fifty and sixty. However legislative 
changes introduced during the late 1960s effectively excluded a slightly younger age cohort: hence 
come 1991, we find a sharp dip in the number of men in their forties. However that dip did not last 
for long, since there is a substantially larger peak amongst men in their thirties. This also has a 
relatively straightforward explanation. Whilst Immigration legislation placed ever tighter 
constraints on the entry of additional adult males, men who were already settled in Britain had an 
unchallengeable right – as Commonwealth citizens – to reunite their families. Hence the peak 
amongst men (and women) aged between 30 and 39 is largely composed of the Pakistani-born 
offspring of the original wave of migrant workers, but who were brought to Britain in a process of 
family reunion before they reached adulthood. A further point worth noting is that the peak amongst 
30-39 year olds is roughly twice as large as that amongst those aged 50-59. This is readily 
explicable in terms of high levels of fertility (4+ children per moth r) both in Pakistan itself, and 
amongst Pakistani settlers in Britain. The reduced numbers amongst those aged between 25 and 29, 
as well the even larger size of the three youngest cohorts can also be explained on a similar basis.  
 
Over and above these large y historical factors, an important additional dynamic has recently begun 
to emerge: the frequency with which members of the younger – and by now overwhelmingly 
British-born – generation of Pakistanis are continuing to find spouses from amongst their kin back 
home. Not only has, this option has been much more strongly sustained amongst Pakistani Muslims 
than by any other group of South Asian settlers in Britain, largely  as a result of their strong 
preference for arranging marriages between cousins (Ballard 1990), but recent research in Bradford  
suggests that 57% of young Bradford Pakistanis married partners from overseas(Simpson 1997).  
 
In the light of all this it is quite clear that Britain’s Pakistani population will continue to follow its 
current pattern of very rapid growth for many years to come. Even if its members’ fertility rate was 
to fall to near replacement rate tomorrow, and even if no further immigration occurred, the levelling 
out the present age skew would ensure that in the long run numbers would eventually stabilise at 
approximately double its present level. But since the mean fertility rate amongst British Pakistanis 
is still closer to 4.0 than the replacement level of 2.0, and given that the recruitment of such a large 
number of spouses (of both sexes) from overseas will substantially increase the number of mothers 
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available to give birth, there is every prospect that Britain’s Pakistani population will more than 
double its present size before too long.  
1.3.2 The Bangladeshis 
At least at first sight the demographic profile of the Bangladeshi population (Figure 3) is very 
similar to that of the Pakistanis: once again there is a clear “wave” effect, particularly amongst men, 
and even though the peak amongst men in the 30-39 year old age cohort may somewhat attenuated, 
the reverse is the case amongst the very youngest age cohorts. Once again these differences fall into 
place in the light of the Bangladeshi’s migration history. Although they initially responded to 
changes in immigration legislation in much the same way as the Pakistanis, and hence made 
extensive use of the voucher system, they differed in so far as they delayed reuniting their families 
in Britain for very much longer. But although that process did not get into full swing until the early 
eighties, and even today is still far from being wholly complete, the Bangladeshis – although 
Muslims too – are much less strongly committed to cousin marriage than are the Pakistanis. Hence 
even though the parents of young British Bangladeshis are still keen to seek out well-connected 
spouses for their offspring from back home, there are strong indications that the frequency of such 
matches is set to drop sharply, such that young British Bangladeshis will increasingly tend to marry 
each other.  
 
Figure 3: The distribution of Britain’s Bangladeshi population by age and sex 
Source: 1991 Census: Ethnic group and Country of Birth Volume, Table 6. 
 
Nevertheless even if it is the case that the arrival of additional spouses from overseas proves to be 
less marked in the Bangladeshi than the Pakistani case, the sheer weight of numbers in the 0 – 14 
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age cohorts means that it would be wholly unreasonable to expect that this section of population 
eventually to stabilise at anything less than double its present level, and in all probability 
substantially more. 
1.3.3 The Indians 
By contrast with the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, Britain’s Indian population is clearly a great deal 
closer to equilibrium, since its age cohorts are all roughly equal in size right up to that composed f 
35-39 year olds, even though there is a comparatively steep drop thereafter. Once again a 
knowledge of immigration history enables us to put this into perspective. Firstly the initial phase of 
mass male migration took place in the late nineteen fift es and early nineteen sixties: hence the 
relative paucity of people who had reached retirement age in 1991, although numbers have clearly 
grown rapidly since then; secondly the Indians moved far more quickly towards reuniting their 
families in Britain than did their Pakistani and Bangladeshi peers; and thirdly there is clear evidence 
that whilst the fertility rate of Indian settlers was initially almost as high as that amongst the 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, it has since declined to a level which is not much greater than that 
found amongst the indigenous population.  
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Britain’s Indian population by age and sex 
Source 1991 Census: Ethnic group and Country of Birth Volume, Table 6. 
 
But although this goes a long way towards expl ining the pattern displayed in Figure 4, it is by no 
means the whole story, especially if one compares the figures for Britain’s Indian population which 
can be derived from the 1981 Census with those thrown up in 1991, which suggests that Britain’s 
Indian population has marginally decreased in size over the decade. There are, of course, some 
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problems with the figures themselves, since the estimate for 1981 is based on the sum of all those 
persons living in a household which was headed by a person born either i  India, or in East Africa, 
but nevertheless a careful comparison of the age and gender related figures from the two censuses 
suggests that around 150,000 people whom one might expect to find were missing by 1991. This 
suggests that during the 1980’s the number of emigrants was substantially greater than the number 
of immigrants in this section of the population.  
 
Once again a qualitative knowledge of developments within the community offers an explanation as 
to how that might be. Although in-migration – particularly of spouses – from India continued to 
occur during the period (and the census figures show that the deficiency in numbers is least salient 
amongst those in their late 20s and early 30s), this was more than matched by a parallel process of 
out-migration, not so much back to India itself, but rather onwards to the United States and Canada. 
The majority of such migrants were young adults, usually with advanced educational and 
professional qualifications, but who had grown frustrated by the forces of racial exclusionism they 
so routinely encountered in Britain; as word began to circulate that those constraints were far less 
intense on the other side of the Atlantic, and ever increasing number of young British Indians 
appear – given the results of the 1991 Census – to have taken the opportunity to move on yet further 
to take advantage of the better opportunities elsewhere.  
1.3.4 The Chinese 
At first sight the figures for Britain’s Chinese population appears to be extremely bizarre, for whilst 
the right-hand portion of the population distribution shown in Table 5 follows the pattern which we 
have now come to expect, with a peak amongst men in their fifties, a pause, and then a family-
reunion precipitated pattern of rapid growth; however this is followed by what appears to be a 
marked deficiency of young people of school age. How is this to be explained? What this appears to 
reflect is not so much a growing tendency of young British Chinese to send their children back to 
Hong-Kong for their education – a plausible explanation for which there is no evidence – but rather 
that a radical process of demographic transition is taking place. Thus just like members of many 
other overseas Chinese communities – as in Singapore, for example – Britain’s young and rapidly 
upwardly mobile Chinese professionals (see Chapter **) are delaying having children, and in any 
event are planning to build much smaller families than did their parents. Hence they are producing 
children at a much lower than replacement level. With that in mind, let alone the fact that the 
Chinese seem just as likely as their Indian peers to be plotting their future careers within the context 
of a global labour market, there is a real prospect that Britain’s Chinese population will shrink 
rather than grow in the years to come. 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Britain’s Chinese population by age and sex 
Source 1991 Census: Ethnic group and Country of Birth Volume, Table 6. 
1.3.5 The Afro-Caribbeans 
Making sense of the data on Britain’s Afro-Caribbean population presents some even greater 
challenges, not least because in this case even the construction of the data itself – let alone it  
interpretation – is an extremely tricky business. Firstly there was, by common agreement, a 
substantial under-count of young Afro-Caribbean men in the 1991 Census, as difference in the size 
of the male and female age cohorts amongst young adults in Figure 6 clearly confirms; secondly the 
way in which the ‘Ethnic Group’ question was asked and answered was such that by no means 
everyone of Afro-Caribbean ancestry necessarily ticked the Black-Caribbean box – or had that box 
ticked for them by whoever filled up the Census form. In 1991 many people of Afro-Caribb an
descent appear to have taken the far from unreasonable view that the “Ethnic Group” question was 
asking about birthplace, rather than ancestry or ethnic affiliation. Hence Caribbean-born parents 
very frequently identified their British-born children as Black-British, whilst ticking the Black-
Caribbean box to identify themselves; as a result as many as half of all school age and pre-school 
age children of Afro-Caribbean descent were classified as Black-Other, rather then Black-
Caribbean, in the published results of the 1991 Census. Hence even though the Black Other 
category undoubtedly includes a small but significant number of people who are not of Afro-
Caribbean descent, the distortions produced by the omission of so many children of Afro-Caribbean 
parentage from the published figures for ‘Black Caribbeans’ is so great that data for the two 
nominally separate ethnic categories have been combined to produce the figures in Table 6. 
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Although it can certainly be argued that this procedure is arbitrary and therefore misleading, it 
nevertheless appears to be a great deal more sensible to make an effort to bring together data on 
persons who actually belong to a single identifiable community, rather than to follow a categorical 
procedure which has equally arbitrarily keep them apart.2 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of Britain’s Afro-Caribbean population by age and sex 
Source 1991 Census: Ethnic group and Country of Birth Volume, Table 6. 
 
But having carried out that exercise, what do the data tell us? The patterns revealed in Figure 6 
suggest that the demographic characteristics of Britain’s Afro-Car bbean population has in many 
respects been even more starkly determined by the impact of immigration controls than any of the 
other communities we have so far considered. Hence the now-familiar bulge of people aged 
between fifty and sixty, together with a considerable tail stretching on into retirement age, can be 
read off as being composed of the people who made their way to Britain as young adults within a 
rather more extended time period between the arrival of the Empire Windrush  in 1948 and the 
imposition of immigration controls in 1962. But if Afro-Caribbeans were rather less successful in 
playing the voucher system to their advantage than were migrants from South Asia, they also soon 
set about reuniting their very substantial families, so producing a eak of people aged between 
twenty and thirty five when the Census was taken in 1991. Numbers then dip amongst teenage 
generation, matching the dip in the 35-45 year olds, but with a large number of young women 
mothers having just come “on-stream” in child-bearing terms when the census was taken, there was 
                                           
2 For a fuller set of arguments about these issues, Ballard and Kalra (1994) and Modood (1997). 
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a substantial rise in the very youngest age cohort. Set against this a comparison between the figures 
shown in Figure 6 and those that can be derived from the 1981 Census suggests – a  with th  
Indians – that there has also been a significant loss of population further up the age scale, and that 
this is particularly marked amongst those who have reached retirement age. This is certainly 
congruent with suggestions that a significant number of elderly people ar  taking the opportunity to 
retire to the Caribbean once they have qualified for a pension.  
 
Making any kind of prediction of the likely future growth of Britain’s Afro-Caribbean population is 
a hazardous task, not least in the light of the doubts and inadequacies built into the data itself. 
Nevertheless it seems that unless other factors – such a  re-emigration, for example – were to 
intervene, Britain’s Afro-Caribbean population will continue to grow steadily in size in the years to 
come, although a great deal less dramatically than in the case of the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.  
1.3.6 The Black Africans 
 
However neat and convenient an ethnic identifier the term “Black African” may seem to be, the 
actual ethnic affiliations of those who fall within its purview are in fact a great deal more diverse 
than in the case of any of other identifiers we have so far considered. In historical terms the African 
presence in Britain is of long-standing, rooted as it is in the settlements established Nigerian and 
Somali ex-seamen in ports such as London, Liverpool, Cardiff and South Shields from as far back 
as the closing years of the nineteenth century. These settlements were subsequently overlaid by the 
arrival of a further group of settlers who were not so much labour igrants – as in the case of 
almost all the groups which we have considered so far – but well educated young men and women 
from Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Ghana who made their way to Britain in search of higher 
educational qualifications. 
 
The salience of this latter group amongst Britain’s Black African population is very evident from 
the patterns revealed in Figure 7, with a sharp peak of persons aged between twenty five and thirty 
five in 1991, and many of whom were still engaged in their studies at the time. However there are 
clear indications of a growth in numbers here too. Once they have gained the qualifications they 
seek, it is only reasonable to expect that they will turn their attention to child-r aring: precisely the 
pattern which Figure 7 reveals. It is also safe to predict that Britain’s Black African population will 
grow substantially in the years to come, although it is still far to early to make any clear predictions 
as to just how rapid that patter of growth will be. 
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Figure 7: Distribution f Britain’s Black African population by age and sex 
Source 1991 Census: Ethnic group and Country of Birth Volume, Table 6. 
 
1.4 Levels of in- and out-marriage amongst the minorities 
 
Although the minority communities which the Census enables us to identify have so far been 
treated as if they were wholly autonomous, and hence as if no inter-ethnic marriages take place, 
such a picture is clearly inadequate: ethnic exogamy may be relatively rare, but it clearly does take
place. Moreover given that the Census is organi ed on a household rather than an individual basis, it 
also allows us to explore such matters – nd even to examine the extent to which such unions are 
grounded either in formal marriage, or in mere cohabitation. In this context this second distinction 
has been ignored, and so Table 4 sets out the proportion of women in each ethnic group who have 
established domestic partnerships with men drawn from each of the other groups, whilst Table 5 
explores the same situation from a male point of view. 
 
In so far as it was once assumed that in any well-established multi-racial society, an ever increasing 
number of cross-boundary would – and indeed should – take place, Tables 5 and 6 are most 
illuminating, above all because of the very high levels of within-group endogamy which they 
reveal: in no group does that figure fall below 69%, whilst over 96% of both Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi women’s partners are drawn from within their own group. Perhaps not surprisingly 
women invariably have rather higher levels of within-group endogamy than do men – with the sole 
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exception of Chinese women, who are substantially more likely to be in a relationship with a non-
Chinese partner (in fact almost invariably White) than are Chinese men. 
 
 
Male Partner 
Female Partner 
White Indian Pakistani Bangla 
deshi 
Chinese Black 
Caribbean 
Black 
African 
White 99.3 4.2 1.1 1.1 22.9 13.2 16.0 
Indian 0.1 94.2 1.3 0.3 0.9 0.3 1.5 
Pakistani 0.0 0.5 96.7 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.4 
Bangladeshi 0.0 0.1 0.1 97.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Chinese 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 74.2 0.1 0.1 
Black Caribbean 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 82.4 3.4 
Black African 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 2.0 77.4 
Table 4 Patterns of ethnic endogamy: percentage of conjugal partnerships (both married and 
cohabiting) between women and men by ethnic group 
Source: 1991 Census, Families and Households Volume, Table 20  . 
 
Female Partner 
Male Partner 
White Indian Pakistani Bangla 
deshi 
Chinese Black 
Caribbean 
Black 
African 
White 99.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Indian 6.7 91.7 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Pakistani 5.0 1.0 92.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Bangladeshi 2.9 0.9 0.3 95.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Chinese 13.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 84.4 0.2 0.1 
Black Caribbean 26.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 69.2 1.0 
Black African 19.8 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.2 5.2 69.7 
Table 5 Patterns of ethnic endogamy: percentage of conjugal partnerships (both married and 
cohabiting) between men and women by ethnic group 
Source: 1991 Census, Families and Households Volume, Table 20 . 
 
Whilst the published Tables do not allow us to explore levels of endogamy by age, which would 
allow us to explore how far the ra e of endogamy is reduced amongst members of the younger, 
British-born generation, it is nevertheless worth noting that levels of endogamy revealed even 
amongst the longest-established sections of the minority population – the Indians and the Black 
Caribbeans – still remain extremely high. This suggest that we are not moving towards a situation 
where marriage is bringing about high levels of inter-ethnic admixture. To be sure there is some 
degree of fraying at the edges, as there always has been: many of the earliest migrants from all 
groups, virtually all of whom were men, established relationships with local women; but the figures 
make it quite clear that we are not moving towards a situation in which marriage is precipitating a 
multi-ethnic melting pot.  
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Hence even though levels of ethnic exogamy may be rising, there can be no dispute that so far that 
rise has been slow, and that it has started from a very low base. Hence the minorities’ present 
marriage patterns still largely sustainestablished ethnic boundaries, rather than break them down, 
and all the indications suggest that this state of affairs will continue for the foreseeable future. But 
what of the offspring of the comparatively small number of inter-ethnic u ions which do take 
place? Although such persons clearly have a mixed ancestry in biological terms, it certainly does 
not follow that their ethnic affiliation is “mixed” in a similar way, or that people of mixed ancestry 
are, of necessity, either confused or uncertain about their social identity. Indeed o e of the most 
striking features of the results of the 1991 Census is that although the ethnic question was designed 
in such a way as to make maximum space for those of mixed ancestry to identify themselves, only a 
relatively small proportion of those who might have taken advantage of that facility actually did so.  
 
This is exactly what one would expect to occur in the context of an ethnically plural society. 
Despite the obsessive concern with which most members of Britain’s indigenous majority continue 
to display about hereditary differences in physical appearance, so much so that they find it 
extremely hard to view the world through anything other racially deterministic spectacles, ethnic 
affiliation is a matter of choice, not of ancestry; it is therefore a social, and not a biological 
construct. But where ethnic pluralism reigns – as it surely does in contemporary Britain, everyone 
has to decide on which side of the wider society’s various internal ethnic disjunctions they stand. 
‘Mixed’ makes very little sense in such a context.  
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